Introduction
This paper brings two simple theoretical insights to bear on cross-country panel data. The first is that individual welfare depends importantly on the possibility to shelter consumption from labour market and health risks, but financial markets are not always so well developed as to allow households to do so effectively. Thus, policies and institutions buffer the impact of labour demand shocks on wages and employment, and taxes and subsidies further decouple household incomes from market outcomes. Such institutions are also expected to be shaped by a second set of theoretical considerations, concerning international integration of economic activity. The risks entailed by international trade and specialization may make government policies' income redistribution role more important. At the same time, however, economic integration makes it more difficult and expensive to implement such policies: international competition increases the relevance of cost competitiveness, makes it difficult to operate social protection schemes based on youth education and lifelong employment, and challenges governments' taxation powers (Sinn, 2003) .
Our empirical analysis, based on these insights, builds upon recent studies of the relationship between international economic integration and governments' interference with free market outcomes. Over the last 100 years, openness to international trade and within-country income inequality have followed very similar U-shapes (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007) . While direct links between the two are difficult to detect empirically (OECD, 2007) , there is strong and robust survey evidence that attitudes towards economic integration are driven by income distribution implications (Mayda, O'Rourke, and Sinnott, 2007) , and that exposure to international competition through foreign direct investment increases perceived job insecurity (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004) . Empirically, more open countries engage in more pervasive interference with market-driven income distribution processes in the data analysed by Rodrik (1998) , Agell (2002) , and others.
The theoretical considerations introduced above suggest that the relationship between economic integration and government policies should depend on the extent to which private contracts can, through formal insurance or self-insurance, make policy less necessary for consumption-smoothing purposes. International competition makes it difficult for governments to meet demand for protection from risk, and makes it increasingly important for households to access private financial markets. Our analysis of cross-country differences and country-specific trajectories in a panel dataset of government policy, financial development, and openness indicators aims at detecting such empirical patterns.
In the data we analyse, international economic integration tends to be accompanied in cross-section by larger government budgets and more intense redistribution, and also tends to be associated with stronger financial market development. Financial development interacts significantly with openness in explaining the intensity of governments' interference with market outcomes, indicating that different income and consumption-smoothing schemes do substitute each other in addressing the insurance needs generated by increasing openness. Over time, controlling for country-specific characteristics, increasing openness tends to reduce government redistribution, and does so more strongly in countries with better private financial markets.
Governments and openness
We begin, following Rodrik (1998) , by inspecting the association in our data between openness and government's involvement with income distribution. We run regressions in the form
where the dependent variable is an indicator of the State's involvement in resource redistribution: either the government share of GDP from the Penn World Tables, a broad measure available for a very wide set of countries, or more direct measures of social policy expenditures, available only for some OECD countries (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of the countries included in the two samples).
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We are interested in empirical relationships between openness as a source of ongoing risk, and spending as a result of policy choices, rather than in the cyclical behaviour of import, exports, and government expenditures within a given structural and policy framework. To reduce the relevance of cyclical fluctuations, we average yearly observations. The timing and length of periods over which averages are computed make very little difference to the results: in our preferred specifications, averages (of logs) are taken over 5-year intervals and, since lagging driving processes reduces endogeneity for some countries are included in specific periods. Table 1 reports regressions of government policy variables on openness measured as the log of the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, averaged over the 10 years previous to the beginning of each 5-year sub-period. As to control variables, it Z in (1), we have experimented with inclusion of the log of per capita GDP at the end of previous subperiod, drawn from the Penn World Tables dataset, and with World Bank area dummies.
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As the empirical evidence is not materially affected by these control variables, we discuss but do not report these results.
Like Rodrik (1998) , and over a longer range of periods, we find in Table 1 Before assessing their empirical relevance in the next section, where we run panel regressions with interaction coefficients, we need to discuss whether the pattern detected by the repeated cross-section results may be driven by misspecification.
If the effect of openness were itself nonlinear, and stronger when openness increases along with financial development, the interaction effects would spuriously pick up that nonlinearity. Including the square of openness among the explanatory variables of the specifications reported in Table 1 returns a positive coefficient only for that reported in Panel A; this motivates us to check, in the regressions reported below, whether inclusion of the squared openness variable changes the estimated coefficients of interaction terms.
In the OECD sample regressions reported in Panels B and C, the squared openness regression coefficient is actually negative (and not significant in most cases): this indicates that misspecification is not the source of nonlinear effects, and fosters confidence in the economic interpretation of financial development interactions.
Finance and redistribution in opening economies
Access to financial instruments makes it less necessary to rely on government redistribution in order to smooth consumption in the face of individual-specific shocks (Bertola and Koeniger, 2007) . Countries are heterogeneous in the effectiveness of their legal and administrative frameworks in supporting markets and administrations, and a large body of work views market development and regulatory interferences as determined by countries' "legal traditions" shaping patterns of substitutability across public and private approaches to income distribution (see La Porta et al., 1998 , and other references in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) . While the flexible Common Law system of Anglo-Saxon countries appears more suitable to support private contractual relationships, the code-based systems of Continental European and other countries influenced by the French legal tradition seem to stifle development of private markets, while perhaps fostering relatively efficient bureaucratic administration of government schemes.
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To assess the relevance of these insights in the datasets analysed in the previous section, we specify models relating openness to indicators of financial development. First, we run regressions in the form
where the indicators of government involvement considered by (1) We report in Table 2 Table 2 estimate a negative (insignificant) coefficient, confirming that more openness to international trade is associated not only with higher volumes but also with better (to the limited extent that it may be observable) efficiency of financial markets.
Next, we assess whether in countries with more developed financial markets the pressure to increase government involvement in response to a greater exposure to international competition is lower. To this end we explore the co-variation between openness, government expenditure, and financial market development running regressions in the
where the credit and price indicators used in (2) for mortgages (see the Appendix for more details on data sources).
Part A of Table 3 reports regressions in the form (3) that estimate how openness and the credit information index perform as explanatory variables of government's share of GDP.
The main effect of openness is positive and significant; more interestingly, the interaction term between openness and the indicator of financial market structure is negative. indicate that the interaction effect is by far less significant when estimated on the OECD subsample of these data. This may indicate that the features captured by differences of credit infrastructure across developed countries are less relevant to our perspective than those observed in the broader sample: intuitively, differences across OECD countries are smaller than those across less developed countries and, especially, those between the two groups of countries.
More precise and relevant information is available for the OECD sample not only as regards the redistribution role of the government, in the form of public social expenditure as a share of GDP introduced and analysed above, but also as regards households' access to financial instruments, in the form of loan-to-value ratios on housing mortgages. In part B of Table 3 we find that, without controls, the interaction between LTV and openness as explanatory variables for public social expenditure is negative in more recent years.
Including GDP as a control explains a large portion of the variation in social spending as a fraction of GDP, and the interaction between LTV and openness, while still negative in more recent years, becomes less significant.
Of course, these results' interpretation is not straightforward: since GDP is not a completely exogenous variable, its impact on the results reflects possible causal relationships between GDP per capita and social spending. From the statistical point of view, however, the declining pattern over time of the openness' slope coefficients in the cross-country regressions of Table 1 is interestingly accounted for by increasingly easy financial market access (across OECD countries, the average LTV was about 75 in the 1980s, and about 90 in the 2000s). These regressions also pick up differences in the paths followed by different countries: while in the 1980s Anglo-Saxon members of the OECD such as the UK and the US already featured LTV ratios greater than 80%, countries such as Italy only converged to such values in the late 1990s, starting from LTV ratios as low as 56% in the earlier periods of the sample.
The relevance of time-series trajectories in these regressions begs more general questions regarding country-specific evolutions and reforms. To assess the extent to which LTV variation accounts for the heterogeneity of estimated coefficients, the next section reports results of panel estimations that constrain coefficients to be the same across all observations and control for country-specific effects.
Dynamics and reforms
The results reported so far establish that globalization tends to be associated with larger governments across countries, but also that this association is less pronounced across developed countries, where it tends to become shallower over time and more strongly so where financial markets are better developed. It is not easy to interpret these and other patterns observed in the data in structural terms, because deeper unobservable variables may determine both government expenditure and the components of openness and financial market structure that reflect policies.
To the extent that historical and geographical factors driving country experiences are stable over time within the sample period, however, it is possible to account for them in terms of country-specific intercept effects. Bertola (2007) reports that, in panel regressions on yearly data with country dummies, the estimates suggest that more openness is associated with less generous social expenditure, and that the relationship is stronger in countries where financial markets are more developed. This may indicate that, within each country, additional demand for socially provided insurance is more than offset by increasingly difficult supply of social protection in conditions of intense international competition. However, the negative association between openness and social policy detected by regressions with country dummies (hence over time for a given country) may well reflect cyclical rather than structural slow-moving mechanisms.
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The period-averaged data used in the present paper makes it possible to smooth out cyclical factors, as well as to control for country-specific effects so as to focus on dynamic relationships. For most of the variables in our regressions it is also possible to construct such averages over a longer time-span than in Rodrik (1998) and Bertola (2007) . Thus, we run regressions of government policy indicators on the previous sub-5 In the annual dataset used in that paper, in fact, allowing for country specific trends as well as intercepts returns a negative coefficient for openness as an explanatory variable of social policy.
To the extent that trends capture deterministic differences of country growth, this indicates that in annual data cyclical fluctuations tend (in this sample) to produce a negative association between social expenditures (in a given policy framework) and measured openness. In Table 4 we report pooled-OLS, random-effects, fixed-effects and first-difference estimates of the coefficients of regressions in the form of equations (3). 6 In the first column of Table 4 , we find that the main effect of openness on social policy is positive and significantly different from zero in pooled panel estimates including interactions with LTV. Random-effects estimation leads to very similar results but fixed-effect estimation (third column of 1990 , and the further discussion in Section 5 below).
In Table 4 , the main effect of openness as an explanatory variable for social policy is positive and significant, if less so in the first-difference estimator of the last column. As in Rodrik's first-differenced specifications, where the interactions of interest were with terms of trade variability (see his Table 5 , p.1018), the more interesting findings are those that relate openness to social policy after accounting for its interaction with the LTV financial development indicator. In the pooled estimates, the main effect is in the order of 0.96, and the interaction coefficient in the order of -0.008. To interpret these results, recall that the association between social policy and openness is measured by FinStruct in the notation of equation (3). As the estimated value of is negative and the LTV ratio ranges between 50% and 105% across the (lagged and averaged) 5-year sub-periods in the sample, the coefficient FinStruct that relates log openness to social policy ranges between one-half for the observations with the poorest financial market conditions, and zero for those with the easiest access to credit.
As to significance, the interacted slope coefficient of openness is statistically different from zero with better than 10% confidence for values of LTV smaller than 100%.
In the panel-data specifications of Table 4 , the inclusion of fixed effects leaves the interaction point estimates essentially unaffected at about -0.009, and the fact that the main effect is estimated at zero implies that over time, for given country-specific characteristics, more openness is for all countries associated with less generous social policy. The interacted coefficient is statistically negative with more than 10% confidence
for LTV values larger than about 96%. Results are qualitatively similar for the firstdifferenced specification, where the interaction term has a lower coefficient. Inclusion of the controls variables mentioned when discussing previous tables leaves all these results unaffected.
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Welfare State models and labour market regulation
Our results indicate that increasing openness does tend to be associated with more government involvement (as in Rodrik's seminal contribution), but only if financial markets are not well developed. Where they are, its main association is that with the financial market outcomes documented by the regressions in the form (3) reported in Table 3 .
Since our analysis focuses on controls of labour-market risk, the social policy expenditure indicator used in the regressions above may be too broad to capture the relationships of interest between insurance-oriented public programmes, openness, and Table 5 market institutions unsurprisingly makes it difficult to detect significant effects. Inclusion of GDP, which turns out to be almost always insignificant, does not affect these results.
All in all, our exploration of more plentiful and precise data confirms the message of Agell's (2002) estimates of bivariate relationships. The tightness of labour market regulation is positively, albeit weakly, related to openness, suggesting that race-to-thebottom tendencies are dominated by demand for stronger protection. In contrast to the regressions above on social policy expenditure indicators, little or no evidence is detected of a less positive relationship over time within country, or of significant interactions with financial market development, with the exception of the of marginal tax rate indicator.
This may indicate that labour market institutions are less directly relevant than taxation and social spending to labour-income and consumption smoothing and, as they are more stable over time, perhaps less subject to race-to-the-bottom tendencies. Future work could fruitfully explore complementarities and substitutabilities between various institutional aspects of different countries' labour markets. Extending Rodrik's (1998) analysis of the relationship between openness and government size to more numerous and recent periods, and to a more precise measure of public redistribution, we have documented that the association between openness and social spending is positive but has become shallower over time. Extending the specification to indicators of financial development, private financial markets appear to substitute for public redistribution along both cross-country and time series dimensions.
Concluding remarks
In cross-section, not only public redistribution but also private financial market transactions tend to increase with international economic openness, addressing the need for consumption smoothing in the presence of international sources of income instability.
Systematically different combinations of public schemes and private contracts are observed in countries characterized by different legal and social traditions. When country-specific intercepts control for such permanent differences, we find evidence of a tendency for globalization to be associated with declining generosity of social spending within each country. The tendency is more pronounced in countries where well developed financial markets absorb a larger proportion of demand for consumption smoothing. As financial markets have become more uniformly well-developed in the OECD, this explains why, in cross-section, public social expenditure has become less positively associated with openness.
Further work aimed at assessing the relative advantages and disadvantages of public and private schemes in different countries, and economic and political sustainability of economic integration trends, could explore the relevance of our theoretical perspective to income inequality. Bertola (2008) finds that the tighter integration between member countries of Europe's Economic and Monetary Union is associated with less generous social policies and, through that channel, higher income inequality. In broader samples of countries, indicators of economic integration are not tightly correlated to income inequality in theory and empirically, and the co-variation of income inequality and financial development is also ambiguously signed in the data (Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 2003) . It would be interesting to see whether clearer results may be obtained accounting for the relationships, documented in the present paper, among these variables and government policies.
DATA APPENDIX
The dataset includes the following variables.
Openness: ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, variable openc, "Openness in Current Prices" from the Penn World Tables 6.2 Unemployment; 8. Housing; 9. Other social policy areas. We exclude old age and survivor pensions (categories 1 and 2).
Indicators of financial development. Indicators in Table 2 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 Log 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 
